Memory Techniques And False Memories
Memories of one-time events are not always reliable. Although such flaws can limit everyday life, they can also be adaptive. Imagine being able to recall every detail of every television advertisement you’ve ever seen and every piece of every argument or other bad experience you’ve ever had. It would be difficult to remember all the details of your life’s events, making it difficult to concentrate on the most important right now. From this vantage point, it’s good that our event memory isn’t a diary of our lives. Reconstructing a recollection of a past event is a creative process that incorporates contexts, scripts, schemas, personal connections, and other organizing techniques (Oakes & Hyman, Jr., 2000).
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A model developed by Pezdek and colleagues supports the roles of plausibility and imagination in false memory generation. On the other hand, their concept is based on research using a Life Events Inventory, a survey that looks at a belief rather than a memory construct. When imagination is used, both belief and memory scores improve significantly, regardless of the likelihood of the occurrence. However, as the number of imagined events increases, so does the memory rating. The level of belief increases with each image.
Discussion
Two primary cognitive techniques address memory functioning. According to the previously accepted Quantity Oriented Approach, memory is viewed as a warehouse into which discrete elements are placed for eventual retrieval. This method emphasizes how much is remembered rather than what is remembered. The contents of the memory store are regarded as simple, discrete units whose significance is determined by their ability to count; regardless of whether the countable units in the storehouse are illogical, the efficacy of memory is measured by the number of countable units in the storehouse.
The most well-known researcher associated with the Quantity Oriented Approach is Herman Ebbinghaus. He then chanted meaningless syllables, defining them as “150 syllables per minute without error.” He studied the rate of learning and forgetting and developed knowledge and forgetting curves and a serial position curve. According to his findings, weariness, time of day, list length, and repetition all affect memory. He was the first to investigate memory using a scientific method rather than philosophical speculation. Ebbinghaus is regarded as a pioneer in memory research.
The second cognitive approach to memory is a recent viewpoint based on Sir Fredrick Charles Bartlett’s 1930s research. Using the cultural fable “The War of the Ghosts,” the Accuracy Oriented Approach proposes a correspondence theory of memory that compares the contents of a person’s memory report to the actual events. Bartlett paved the way for researchers to study memory in terms of both accuracy and quantity. As a result, researchers began to focus on memory errors while recollecting events. In the Accuracy Oriented Approach, memory is defined simply as the perception of the past and can be understood as goal-directed and purposeful. Memory errors are most likely caused by forgetting, which manifests itself as a loss of correlation between memory reports and natural occurrences. Forgetting causes information loss and qualitative memory distortions (Koriat et al., 2000).
The correspondence theory of the Accuracy Oriented Approach to Memory includes two critical long-term memory systems. The first type of memory is procedural memory, or memory for doing things. It’s possible that this information isn’t based on a correct recollection. You may remember learning to eat, tie your shoes, and walk, but you may not recall learning these skills. The second type of memory is declarative memory, which is a memory for how things are or will be. Declarative memory includes things like what you learn in a textbook or while traveling around the world. Declarative memory is classified into two types: semantic memory and episodic memory. Semantic memory is a memory for general world information (Tulving, 1985). Take into account the fact that you are aware of your birth. You have no memory of that day, but you are still alive. As a result, you must have been born on that date.
This study focuses on episodic memory, or recollections of real-life events (Tulving, 1985); autobiographical memory, or vivid recollection of an event that happened at a specific time and place in one’s life (Tulving, 1985). (Nelson & Fivush, 2004). Certain scholars may use these two names interchangeably. According to the current literature review, autobiographical memory refers to recollections of personally significant events rather than memories of unimportant events. Autobiographical reminiscences are snapshots of someone’s life. What is the purpose of such a memory system? These memories are directive because they both influence and predict behavior. Autobiographical reminiscences allow us to share our lives with others. They form the basis of our sense of self. Our memories of personal events shape our identities or who we are. They are the authors of autobiographies (Williams, Conway & Cohen, 2008).
What factors influence autobiographical memory formation? What do you remember doing this morning or on your sixteenth birthday? Converting new information into memories is described in the Multi-Store Model and Information Processing Theory (Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968). Memory capacity is equivalent to that of a computer in this concept. The sensory register receives much data, almost any sensory information in the environment. The sensory register is constantly bombarded with unencoded data. If we pay attention to something, it is stored in working memory. Working memory can only hold a limited amount of data for a short period. This new knowledge is stored in long-term memory by connecting it with previously remembered information. Sensory modalities used to encode events include sight (imagery), hearing, smell, touch, and taste. Different data types (temporal, spatial, emotional, and semantic) are stored in other parts of the brain. During event recall, details are stitched together using various information accumulated throughout the brain to produce a coherent memory. This is known as reconstruction, and it allows for memory errors caused by personal expectations or misunderstandings (Bartlett, 1932).
False Recollections
False memories are inaccuracies that occur during memory reconstruction. These blunders can be errors that alter an existing memory for an event, which is frequently triggered by incorrect post-event information, or they can be entirely manufactured and implanted memories for hypothetical events. The former memory error is strongly linked to eyewitness evidence and police and judicial interrogation processes. While most academics were preoccupied with memorizing discrete chunks of information like letters, numbers, and nonsense syllables, memory researcher Elizabeth Loftus began investigating eyewitness memory. Loftus began researching how post-event information, also known as misinformation, can interfere with event recollection. In a well-known study on the disinformation effect conducted by Loftus, Miller, and Burns, participants were shown slides of an automobile accident (1978). Following viewing the falls, researchers posed questions designed to imply and mislead people. “Did you see the truck slam into the automobile while speeding through a yellow light?” the researcher might ask. More significant words, such as “smash” rather than “hit,” changed participants’ memories of the incident, resulting in more detailed accounts that suggested bodily injury.
In contrast to the misinformation effect, false memories are entirely fabricated recollections of events that never actually occurred. These recollections, known as false autobiographical memories, are memories of events that never happened. False memories are variables in laboratory research that become synonymous with what research designs are evaluating. They have operationalized concepts and research measurement products (Brainerd & Reyna, 2005). Most studies look at a shift from a pretest measure to an identical posttest with some intervention in between affecting the independent variables in the issue to determine if a false memory has occurred.
Loftus and Pickrell (1995) are credited with being among the first researchers to investigate implanting completely fabricated autobiographical memories for events that never occurred. Twenty-four adult participants were asked to recall incidents told to researchers by close family members. Three of the events were true. A fictitious event involved a youngster becoming lost in a shopping mall. According to the findings, participants were led to believe they had witnessed a wholly fabricated event. Loftus and Ketcham (1994) proposed entirely fictitious events for evaluating false memories, which have since been revised several times in the literature. Allegations of child abuse and numerous treatment procedures such as hypnosis and dream analysis are all consequences of completely fabricated memories. Hyman, Husband, and Billings (1995; Loftus, Joslyn, and Page, 1998) refute psychoanalysts’ claims about repression by recalling entirely fabricated incidents from childhood.
Is it possible to block memory for a highly emotional and frequently unpleasant experience, only for the memory to resurface later due to a treatment technique? The debate over repressed memory vs. false memory has pitted physicians against researchers. The topic gained traction in the mid-1990s. In 1994, approximately 10,000 people claimed to have recovered childhood sexual abuse memories (Toglia, 1996). Sigmund Freud founded psychoanalysis, a method of systematic inquiry, a collection of ideas, and a structured approach to therapy for people suffering from mental and emotional problems. His repression theory is a component of psychoanalysis, and no precise definition of what it entails exists. Clinicians derive and apply a variety of interpretations and applications that are tailored to their needs and perspectives. In therapy, suppressed retrieved memories frequently take precedence over the issue that brought the patient to treatment in the first place, and the therapeutic emphasis is lost (Toglia, 1996).
Like most of Freud’s ideas, a repression hypothesis lacks empirical support. Even Freud’s accusations of a suppression theory and traumatic events are ironic. For starters, he never demonstrated that childhood sexual abuse causes mature disorders. Second, Freud recognized and observed that not all retrieved memories were accurate. Third, according to Freud, psychoanalytic techniques may induce the production of memories, implying that these recollections are not genuine (Toglia, 1996). According to Freud, many rediscovered memories were patients’ suppressed incest fantasies (Freud, Bonaparte, & Kris, 1954).
Loftus studies repression, and while she believes there are cases of repressed memories of traumatic events, she does not think that suppression is widespread. Natural forgetting mechanisms such as decay, retroactive interference, or infantile amnesia can all cause memory loss. Memory recovery is also aided by research on hypermnesia or vivid recollections of the past. Most experimental approaches to the repressed memory/false memory debate use misleading post-event information. Stressful circumstances are an intriguing point that should be addressed throughout this debate. Is the encoding of stressful experiences scrutinized more or less?
Researchers attempt to take a balanced approach to healing from traumatic life events. Regaining repressed childhood memories may be possible, though these restored experiences are unlikely to have occurred (Williams et al., 2008). Post-event information obstructs recollection of that event when combined with the less rigorous encoding of essential elements during a stressful experience.
Variables that influence memory include plausibility and imagination.
The plausibility of an occurrence refers to whether or not someone could have witnessed it. An implausible event has a low probability of occurring among the cohort studied. For example, someone who has never visited a shopping mall will have no memory of getting lost in one as a child. For over a decade, plausibility has been studied as a potential variable influencing false memory production. As a first stage in the process, most models of false memory creation include one’s assessment of plausibility. As the possibility of an event increases, so does the likelihood of planting a false memory or bolstering erroneous autobiographical beliefs (Sharman & Scoboria, 2009). According to the researchers, the lack of a faulty memory effect from low plausibility events is due to little or no search for information in memory during recall.
Is background information mixed with plausibility, as addressed by Pezdek et al. (2006a)? Is a lack of prior knowledge caused by the unfamiliarity of the event the cause of the lack of a false memory effect or a search for important material for low-probability occurrences? Participants in this study were given background information or prevalence data for a fictitious incidence. A screenplay for the planned event and background information was provided to demonstrate how an event happens. The prevalence of an occurrence was the subject of prevalence data. To examine changes in belief evaluations from pretest to posttest administrations, a Life Events Inventory (LEI) was used. It was discovered that belief had grown as a result of the findings. It had an effect when prevalence ratings were used to test the construct of plausibility. The outcome was unaffected by background information (Pezdek et al., 2006a). Hart and Schooler (2006) extended this conclusion beyond a belief measure to a memory measure. After reading prevalence statistics for selected childhood events (LES), participants were given a self-report assessment called the Life Experiences Scale (LES). This scale looks at memory as well as belief. Participants rate how vivid an incident is in their memories and how certain they saw it. The findings revealed that as plausibility increased, so did confidence. Memory did not change significantly, but it came close to being significant.
Sharman and Scoboria (2009) investigated how its plausibility influences people’s perceptions and memories of an incident. The likelihood of the study was determined by the prevalence assessments provided by participants during phase one. The investigation was completed in three stages by the participants. In the first place, the ABMQ (Autobiographical Belief and Memory Questionnaire) was used to assess plausibility, belief, and memory. Participants were then asked to imagine three of ABMQ’s first-phase events. Finally, the same ABMQ was completed as in step one. Regardless of whether the experience was realistic, the results showed increased belief.
On the other hand, Pezdek et al. (2006) discovered that belief increased independently of plausibility for all occurrences. Unlike Hart and Schooler (2006), who found no effect on memory, the memory measure increased for all events. High plausibility occurrences grew the most, followed by moderately plausible occurrences and low plausibility occurrences. These findings contradict the findings of Hart and Schooler.
A second significant variable studied in the research on false memory is imagery skills. “imagination inflation” refers to increased belief caused by increased imagination. The literature strongly supports imagination inflation as a significant contributor to false memories. Researchers used a single imagining and several imaginings (Pezdek et al., 2006). (Thomas & Loftus, 2002). The imagination-inflating effect occurs when the idea of an event is confused with actually witnessing the event, known as a source monitoring error, resulting in a false memory. When a false memory is created, the source is misinterpreted, causing an individual to confuse the event’s imagined existence with its natural occurrence.
Mazzoni and Memon (2003) investigated whether imagination can influence autobiographical beliefs and memories. Theirs was the first study to examine creativity independently rather than with other factors such as parental advice or other authoritative figures. The suggested event, a nurse extracting a skin sample from my little finger, is unlikely to occur because the procedure is not used in the United Kingdom, where the study was conducted. On a three-point scale, when participants imagined events once, the data revealed a significant increase in belief and a significant increase in memory.
Scoboria et al. (2004) developed a tiered model of false memories to explain the link discovered between the components in faulty memory research using data collected using the ABMQ. Regarding how the process works, this is not a model of incorrect memory generation. Most false memory models include several structures that aid in integrating the various systems involved in the wrong memory process. Unique possibility, which is required for belief and memory, requires generic plausibility, according to the layered model. If an individual has a memory of an event, they must believe in its occurrence and find it likely for themselves and the general population. To consider an event’s experience, it must be personally credible. Individuals who recall an event must believe that it occurred. To assess general plausibility, personal plausibility, autobiographical belief, and autobiographical memory, the ABMQ asks a series of questions about each suggested event. As a result of the procedure, their deep relationship is revealed. A remembered answer corresponds to the ABMQ’s memory measure in the context of Tulving’s study, whereas a known response corresponds to the ABMQ’s belief measure. For example, you may be aware of your birth date, corresponding to a belief, but you do not recall the event. The nested model has some flaws. For example, if a person shakes hands with the president, his overall believability rating for the event will be low, but his plausibility rating will be high.
The researchers investigated the impact of plausibility on belief and discovered evidence to support the layered relationship (Hart & Schooler, 2006; Mazzoni, Loftus & Kirsch, 2001). Mazzoni (2007) separated the concepts of plausibility and belief using a behavioral metric called response times. These concepts are distinct, despite their connection. Participants rated their beliefs and plausibility for six occurrences—a computer-measured reaction latency to determine the time between the event’s display and rating. According to the findings, plausibility is the first stage in developing a belief assessment, and reaction times for plausibility evaluations corresponded more strongly than belief ratings. There was no memory search for occurrences initially thought improbable, and response times were longer than expected in practical situations. When asked about belief inexperience, this plausibility evaluation was also linked to the reaction delay for each event.
Pezdek et al. (1997) developed a false memory construction model based on strategic reasoning in which a suggested false event is first evaluated as genuine after which features of a generic script and details of related event memories are carried in memory and used to form a memory for a false event. As part of this study, Catholic and Jewish students were instructed to read a variety of situations, some of which were genuine and some of which were not. According to Pezdek (1997), occurrences were suggestively inserted into a memory based on personal plausibility and script-relevant information gleaned from data. Catholic students did not attend a Jewish prayer session, while Jewish students did not receive Communion. They were astounded by the events.
Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, and Gabbay (2006) expanded on Pezdek et al. (1997) ‘s proposed model of false memory in research incorporating imagination and event plausibility. The study was divided into three stages, each one week apart, and involved two LEI administrations with an intervention. Participants were given packets containing prevalence ratings for each goal occurrence during the intervention. Background information was not considered when grading believability as an individual construct because no script information was provided. Some events were made up, while others were not. Phase two participants completed a second LEI identical to the one given in phase one.
Dodson and Schacter (2002) identified a specific heuristic technique that promotes erroneous recollections of events during recall using heuristic reasoning. It is defined as a process that reduces misattribution errors and reactions. Based on this metacognitive anticipation, people anticipate recalling vivid event details and making recognition judgments. Depending on the belief, the uniqueness heuristic may be a cognitive activity that occurs during retrieval and either blocks or stimulates false memories, both in terms of misinterpreting event details and developing false autobiographical memories.
Dodson and Schacter modified the traditional DRM paradigm by including images of what participants would see and the visual letter cue of the item word. When visual encoding was used, the erroneous identification of associated lure words was significantly reduced. Participants had metacognitive anticipation that they would remember the graphical information because of the unique presentation. As a result of their inability to recall the provided image, they concluded that the lure item was terrific and had never been offered before.
Mazzoni and Kirsch developed a model of metacognition and false memory to elaborate on the heuristic reason. The proposed model of metacognition and memory by Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) is based on a constructivist approach to memory, in which memories are generated during encoding and then rebuilt during retrieval. A question about an incident is asked, which starts a memory search while also activating monitoring mechanisms. Metacognition comprises people’s knowledge and beliefs about cognitive processes and the online control procedures used to monitor and direct underlying cognitive processes (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002). Metacognition is a person’s theory about cognition, defined as a set of beliefs or a naive approach.
In previous metacognitive theories, Mazzoni and Kirsch (2002) distinguished between autobiographical belief and memory. Deciding on an event based on more general information implies autobiographical belief. Faith can be held with varying degrees of certainty and be correct or incorrect. Autobiographical memory is retrieving data from one’s memory store and forming a mental image. Beliefs are inferential, whereas memories are direct experiences. Ideas may be based on personal experience or information obtained from other sources (Mazzoni & Kirsch, 2002).
Conclusion
There are numerous future research opportunities in this area. Evaluating various survey tools and statistical methodologies is a great place to start. Is the ABMQ a valid and reliable assessment of the four components of the false memory process: general plausibility, personal plausibility, belief, and memory? Should change scores be used as the dependent measure of research, or are raw scores more accurate? Which statistical test yields the most precise estimate of false memories? Literature is scarce on using SEM to analyze incorrect memory generation, and this method should be used to validate survey instruments used in research. Instead of manipulating this variable in the future, researchers should consider allowing participants to determine the plausibility of the event in question so that results can account for low plausibility events at the pretest, allowing for the detection of a false memory effect due to visual imagery that is not confounded by regression to the mean. Assume that a result of imagination on memory is discovered again. In that case, researchers must investigate how far or how many imaginings this shift in memory criterion occurs and thus attempt to understand why this effect exists, possibly by looking for patterns of detail amount and typing in the descriptions provided for each image.
The current study’s findings have implications for the entire judicial system, including law enforcement personnel, eyewitnesses, jurors, and the therapeutic context. The concept that recurrence or elaboration of visual imagery can alter a person’s memory of an event, even if it occurs infrequently, is critical to grasp when questioning people about their past experiences. When people are urged to repeatedly visualize an event to remember as many details as possible, such as in therapists’ interrogation and guided imagery techniques, they may recall false information.
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References
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Question 
We’ve seen that memory is a highly complex thing. Success in school depends on remembering facts and figures while relating them to a general theory or philosophy. Discuss some of the memory techniques you use in studying and how they relate to the memory process. Discuss false memories and their impact as well. Can you give examples of a time you experienced a false memory? Watch the video below about false memories.
Memory Techniques And False Memories
link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EUEuASXOyvE
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